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*E.I.P.R. 197  The dominant justification for intellectual property rights at least in the West 
and international treaties is utilitarian, and more precisely based on the Chicago School of 
Law and Economics (first section). However, this school of thought is both flawed and 
ideological (second section). Basing protection solely on the economic aspect of utility (i.e. 
income) has been increasingly challenged in recent years. We thus propose that intellectual 
property rights should be justified using a notion of utility based directly upon well-being, 
rather than using income as a proxy. We outline a theory-neutral approach to well-being that 
could be employed for this purpose (third section). Our proposal, like any and every other 
legal programme, cannot avoid being ideological (fourth section) but it avoids the flaws of 
the Law and Economics approach. It is also not paternalistic (fifth section).  
Introduction  
Choosing a policy over another depends very much on what one wants to achieve in society. 
Up to now, the rhetoric in policy-making has been driven by economic growth and a 
country’s prosperity. But research has shown that economic wealth is an inadequate proxy for 
general well-being: the former is only one contributory factor towards the latter. Recently, 
some politicians have awoken to that fact and have vowed to concentrate on well-being.
1
 
However, the current intellectual property rights (IPR) rhetoric in policy-making is still 
focused on economic growth and on (social) welfare as defined by orthodox economists.
2
  
This article discusses the utilitarian justification of IPR. We assume that in principle 
utilitarian considerations are relevant to the justification of IPR, but acknowledge that they 
are not necessarily the only relevant considerations. We are concerned with the question of 
how "utility" should be defined for this purpose. We reject the assumption underlying the 
Law and Economics approach that economic indicators such as GDP can be taken as proxies 
of national well-being. Instead, recognising that there are competing theories of well-being, 
we argue for a theory-neutral approach. This takes advantage of the fact that, although 
different theories disagree on what constitutes well-being, there is likely to be a broad area of 
common ground between them on what we call the "markers" of well-being: things which are 
either constitutive, productive or indicative of well-being. This area of common ground can 
thus be used in policy-making. Our proposal, like any and every other legal programme, 
cannot avoid being ideological but it avoids the flaws of the Law and Economics approach. 
Although IPR justified in terms of well-being may appear paternalistic at first sight, we argue 
that it is not paternalistic as far as individuals are concerned. 
Before we embark in our discussion, it is important to first clarify the meaning of the most 
important terms we use in this article, namely "intellectual property rights", "happiness" and 
"well-being", as often people use them to mean different things. 
In this article, we use the term "intellectual property rights" to refer solely to patents and 
copyright. This is because the utilitarian justification is more suited to these two rights than to 
trade marks and related rights (such as geographical indications). By contrast with patents 
and copyright, trade marks apply to signs rather than products. They mainly serve as an 
indication of origin so as to avoid consumer confusion. The rationale for protecting them is 
therefore different from that justifying patents and copyright. We acknowledge that an 
investment function close to that of patents and copyright also exists for trade marks, but it is 
not the dominant one and is only really relevant to some trade marks, namely well-known 
ones. To the extent that designs are a hybrid between patent and copyright and that other 
intellectual property rights related to patents and copyright, such as plant variety rights and 
copyright neighbouring rights, can also be justified by utilitarian concerns, the reasoning in 
this article can apply to them too. However, for reasons of space, we have only conducted the 
analysis in relation to*E.I.P.R. 198  patents and copyright proper, and further analysis is 
necessary to see if our conclusions would hold for rights related to patents and copyright. 
We use the term "well-being" to refer to the overall quality of a person’s life—well-being is 
what someone has if their life is going well for them. Though the term "happiness" is 
sometimes used as a synonym for "well-being", we use it here in a slightly different sense to 
refer to a subjective mental state of some kind, or an aggregation of mental states, which 
reflects a person’s positive affective response to and/or evaluation of their life at a given time. 
The rationales of intellectual property law  
This section shows that the predominant theory justifying IPR is the utilitarian rationale, also 
called the incentive theory. 
As is known, there are two main justifications for IPR—teleological (or consequential) and 
deontological. Originally, civil law countries adopted deontological justifications and 
common law countries consequential ones. Within each of these justifications, there are two 
sub-categories. In deontological justifications, we find natural rights and personality rights, 
and in consequentialist ones, the utilitarian theory and its derivatives.
3
 Because the utilitarian 
justification for IPR is the basis on which our article is built, we spend a little bit of time 
reminding readers about it. 
The first consequentialist theory is the utilitarian rationale, which is also often called 
incentive theory. It is based on Bentham’s axiom that the measure of right and wrong (and 
therefore the appropriate basis for making legal and social decisions) is "the greatest 
happiness of the greatest number", which has become known as utilitarianism.
4
 This rationale 
translates as follows in the case of patents, copyright and related rights: because inventions 
and creations are easily copied by others, it is not possible for the creator or inventor to be 
adequately recompensed for the effort involved in producing them. Thus there is insufficient 
incentive for people to create and innovate. However, in utilitarian terms, it is desirable for 
intellectual outputs to be produced as there will be a greater sum of happiness as a result. To 
remedy this problem, some protection must be granted to authors and inventors. The current 
type of legal protection for such intellectual efforts is property rights. These exclusive rights 
give authors and inventors the possibility to recoup their investment by ensuring that they are 
the only ones to be allowed to sell their creations and inventions on the market for some time. 
In other words, they have a legal monopoly on their endeavours for a limited period of time, 
after which these inventions and creations fall into the public domain and can be used by all 
freely. 
The second consequentialist justification is derived from the utilitarian rationale; it is its 
translation in economic theory applied to law. As this justification is well known to IP 
experts, we do not restate it here but refer the reader to the literature.
5
  
Suffice it to say that according to orthodox economists, enacting intellectual property rights is 
the best mechanism to allow creators and inventors to appropriate the fruits of their labour 
and makes private production of such information goods possible at a better level of 
production for society. 
These four theories remain the main and most popular theories justifying intellectual property 
today.
6
 But, by far, the current prevailing justification for IPR is the utilitarian rationale and 
its derivatives, be it at*E.I.P.R. 199  international level,
7
 in the US
8
 or the EU,
9
 whether in 
policy-making
10
, legislation or case law.
11
 Furthermore, it is generally the more elaborated 
economic analysis of intellectual property law in its narrow approach (i.e. the neo-classical 
branch of Law and Economics or the so-called Chicago School) which dominates,
12
 even if to 
some extent contemporary European intellectual property law is still influenced by natural 
law.
13
 Because the law and economics of IPR is currently the predominant basis for IPR, and 
also because it suffers from many flaws, it deserves longer treatment and we turn to it in the 
next section. Finally, while we recognise that deontological justifications have a role to play 
in justifying IPR, our focus in the remainder of the article is solely on the consequentialist 
justification. 
The Law and Economics of intellectual property rights—why it is flawed and 
ideological  
This section summarises the origins of the Law and Economics movement (L & E), discusses 
its application to IPR, uncovers the L & E’s flaws and reviews the literature’s criticisms of 
the L & E of IPR. 
The Law and Economics movement  
The Law and Economics movement, also called the economic analysis of the law, started in 
the US in the 1960s, among others with the work of Coase,
14
 and developed throughout the 
1970s and 1980s, chiefly with the work of Posner.
15
 It then gradually spread in most Western 
countries.
16
 L & E derives from American legal realism
17
 and also directly from 
utilitarianism.
18
 L & E is one of the most important and predominant contemporary American 
legal methodologies, perspectives or movements
19
; it pervades virtually all areas of the law 
and claims to provide a general theory of law.
20
 It is therefore not surprising that it is also 
dominant in the field of intellectual property law, including in IPR*E.I.P.R. 200  policy-
making.
21
 Its world success may be owed to the fact that it has strong advantages over other 
theories: it provides a common language of discussion and it crosses geographical and legal 
borders,
22
 but it also prevails in comparison with other, philosophical, justifications for IPR, 
because economics is a science and is thus in search of truth and is not ideological.
23
 But, in 
fact, neither the definition of L & E nor that of the science of economics is set, and the fact 
that there are different definitions implies an ideological aspect.
24
 There are three ways of 
conducting an economic analysis of the law: the analysis can be positive (it explains 
something and predicts what will happen)
25
; normative (it prescribes the law)
26
; or descriptive 
(it describes the rules, judgments and institutions in the language of economics).
27
  
The law and economics of intellectual property rights  
Like the L & E of other branches of law, the L & E of intellectual property has several 
strands which have different ideologies and methodologies.
28
 These strands correspond to the 
several generations of the L & E movement and are, in chronological order of development: 
the Chicago School of L & E, the Yale School of L & E, transaction cost and neo-
institutional L & E, behavioural L & E and development L & E.
29
 The strongest strand is the 
Chicago School of Law and Economics, and it is also the mainstream one. The other 
branches are weaker, to different degrees.
30
  
The Chicago School is conservative in its politics
31
 and, some would say, reductionist in its 
economics.
32
 According to this version, law has to do with the maximisation of aggregate 
wealth and the promotion of allocative efficiency.
33
 It assumes fully rational individuals 
motivated solely by wealth maximisation. In this model, "a person’s value and moral worth 
exist in and only in the degree to which that person is willing and able to pay".
34
 Notably, it is 
economic wealth, not utility or happiness, which the Chicago School is concerned with.
35
 The 
Chicago School also generally believes that economics explains everything.
36
 For them, 
because markets are self-correcting, private economic power is less problematic than 
government intervention in the market.
37
 In its normative analysis, efficiency is the goal and 
distributional justice is excluded. 
The other branches are more nuanced than the Chicago School. Indeed, a normative L & E 
analysis can have other goals, such as a distributional principle, alongside the efficiency goal. 
For instance, the Yale School uses more complex and more flexible assumptions. For 
instance, they believe that people want to maximise their personal wealth but also others’ 
well-being. Distributional justice is included, and the definition of efficiency is more 
complex. They recognise more market failures and thus more government intervention 
necessary to remedy them.
38
 However, overall, the different branches of the L & E movement 
still embody some of the flaws of the neo-classical model: in other words, they fail to capture 
several important aspects of innovation.
39
 Also, wealth maximisation became and still is the 
dominant criterion in all L & E movements.
40
  
The flaws of the economic analysis of law  
The economic analysis of law suffers from several flaws. The main shortcomings of L & E 
are the assumptions it makes. The most important ones are the following. First and foremost, 
while economics as a science is positivist in nature, lawyers are normative and introduced 
this*E.I.P.R. 201  normative analysis into their writings.
41
 Secondly, economics assumes the 
rationality of the consumer (homo economicus): s/he wants to maximise his/her well-being, 
and this equates to wealth, which is measurable in monetary units. So orthodox economics 
substituted utility with wealth.
42
 In 1979, Posner further said that wealth maximisation was 
not a second best but had to be preferred normatively.
43
 However, this position disregards the 
decreasing marginal utility of wealth.
44
 Thirdly, the Chicago School also presumes that 
consumer preferences are fixed, i.e. never influenced by external factors, whereas in reality 
this is untrue.
45
 Fourthly, the L & E analysis assumes the reign of the consumer and thus that 
his preferences must be accepted. However, many studies have now shown that people are 
poor judges of what is good for them and, above a certain point, maximising wealth does not 
make people happy.
46
 Last but not least, a major problem with most normative L & E 
analysis is its fundamental ideological basis and often objectionable consequences.
47
 The 
Chicago School takes the current distribution of wealth as a given, so that if it is unjust, this 
does not matter to the analysis. Apart from the Pareto notion of efficiency, there are other 
economic criteria to enhance welfare such as equal distribution.
48
 And, in fact, a more equal 
distribution seemingly increases welfare.
49
  
An additional problem is that the Chicago School has not only influenced (and still 
influences) scholars, but has influenced both the right and the left, which has now adopted its 
wealth maximisation rhetoric too.
50
 In short, no one disputes L & E any longer
51
; it is 
accepted as scientific and thus as true. But, as this analysis has revealed, it is an ideological 
belief
52
 and reliance on the above-mentioned flawed assumptions also makes L & E unfit for 
normative legal analysis.
53
  
These same flaws are present in the L & E of intellectual property. Nevertheless, at the start 
of the L & E movement, many economists were not convinced that granting property rights 
on information goods was efficient. For these sceptical economists, first mover advantage, 
tying, updates and imperfections in markets meant that inventors and creators had sufficient 
incentives and no IPR were needed.
54
 But this scepticism did not spread and the first 
mainstream economists were,
55
 and most contemporary orthodox economists are, in favour of 
strong property rights for information goods.*E.I.P.R. 202  
56
  
Recent developments in the L & E of IPR literature and criticisms  
Furthermore, during the last decade, the mainstream literature on L & E of IPR has shifted 
from an incentives paradigm to a proprietary paradigm.
57
 Incongruously, it brings the US 
closer to the natural rights justification which still exists in European continental countries, so 
that the philosophical divide between the US and European continental countries is fading.
58
 
According to this proprietary model, "every potential economic value ought to be 
propertised"
59
; thus it does not encompass the limits to IPR so fundamental in the utilitarian 
rationale. This new version of L & E is based on the economic justification for tangible 
property and land and the tragedy of the commons.
60
 Its focus is the management of IPR once 
they have been created. Probably the reason for shifting from the incentives paradigm to the 
proprietary model is the methodological and empirical problems of the incentives paradigm. 
This is not to say that the new L & E has abandoned the incentive theory altogether. But it 
has shifted from an ex ante incentives justification to an ex post one.
61
 It shifts the focus on 
maximising society’s welfare to maximising the intellectual property owner’s profit.62 The 
problem is that this new model does not take into consideration the difference between 
physical and intellectual property and the fact that the tragedy of the commons was only a 
positive theory and, again, the L & E movement placed it into a normative framework for 
IPR.
63
  
However, scholars who have criticised the Chicago School as applied to IPR but have kept 
within the utilitarian discourse have argued that, in some cases, IPR are not needed: namely 
when information goods are produced without the incentive in the first place (e.g. academic 
works, works created for fun) and works of fine art created in a single copy.
64
 In those cases, 
granting IPR actually makes society worse off.
65
 And in some cases, one size does not fit all. 
Empirical evidence suggests that the costs of innovation vary with the type of technology and 
thus there should be different intellectual property rationales and so different intellectual 
property regimes rather than a single one.
66
 More precisely, the length, breadth and standard 
of protection must differ depending on the different economic environments (i.e. the shape of 
demand curve, the rate at which improvements to existing technologies are developed or 
relative costs of later innovators).
67
 And there is a lot of flexibility to design IPR to reflect 
these differences. There are already different intellectual property regimes which vary in 
length, breadth and standard of protection for different types of subject-matter (e.g. copyright 
is different from patents, which are different from plant variety rights, database rights, etc.). 
So, for example, it is possible to tailor patents even further depending on the type of industry, 
etc. More recently, alongside behavioural and empirical studies, experimental approaches are 
being conducted to assess intellectual property incentives.
68
 Some of the most recent legal 
literature critical of L & E also argues that we need to take other considerations into account 
that L & E leaves out.
69
  
In conclusion, it is clear that the current predominant Chicago School L & E of IPR is deeply 
flawed. On the one hand, even if it purports to include other approaches, much of the current 
critical literature still rests on L & E’s flawed assumptions. On the other hand, more recent 
branches of L & E try to address these flaws but still use the proxy of income. However, as 
we shall see in the next section, this assumption has been challenged, and research has shown 
that income does not equate with well-being. Consequently, we must take not income but 
well-being itself as a criterion in order to determine whether IPR lead to "the greatest 
happiness of the greatest number".*E.I.P.R. 203   
What well-being research has shown and why the current predominant 
justification for IPR must be revisited  
Utilitarianism  
Utilitarianism as a political and moral philosophy has been subject to a number of well-
known challenges. For example, it has been claimed to be excessively demanding, forcing 
individuals to subordinate personal projects and principles to the impersonal general good
70
; 
it appears—at least in its classical, act-utilitarian form—to conflict with certain widespread 
intuitions about right and wrong, sanctioning acts that are conventionally regarded as morally 
wrong if these would produce greater good overall; its focus on maximising the amount of 
good, irrespective of where it falls, has raised concerns about distributive justice.
71
 
Utilitarians have made various responses to these challenges.
72
  
In this article, we make no attempt to debate the merits of utilitarianism as a moral and 
political philosophy, and take it that the utilitarian foundations of the justification of 
intellectual property law are adequately solid, provided that "utility" can be defined in an 
appropriate way. This assumption may seem questionable at first sight, given the many issues 
that utilitarianism raises. However, we believe that the assumption is a reasonable one, for 
two reasons: first, the utilitarian arguments for IPR do not, in fact, require the adoption of a 
thoroughgoing utilitarian political philosophy. They do not require us to adopt the principle 
of utility, the greatest happiness principle or something similar as the sole criterion 
determining right and wrong. All that is required is that we accept some notion of utility as 
one criterion—not necessarily the only one—which is relevant to law and public policy, and 
in particular to intellectual property law. If it is true (1) that if something promotes utility, 
that is a point in its favour; and (2) that IPR do promote utility, then the argument is valid—
intellectual property law (or at least, those elements of it for which (1) is true) can be justified 
on utilitarian grounds. 
Whether (2) holds is open to debate. The extent to which it holds may vary between different 
types of IPR, and between individual cases.
73
 The question of how widely it holds falls 
outside the scope of this article, but it is plausible enough that it holds at least some of the 
time. Condition (1) requires only a modest claim that seems entirely reasonable in principle, 
subject to clarification of one important point. We will need to define how we are going to 
interpret the term "utility" in order to satisfy ourselves that this is indeed something to be 
promoted. This will be the subject of the next section of this article. 
Basing the utilitarian justification of intellectual property law on this modest claim renders 
the classic objections to utilitarianism irrelevant, to a large extent. Since the criterion is that 
intellectual property law should promote —not necessarily maximise—utility, we do not need 
to worry about the problems that are associated with maximisation. Since we are not 
embracing utilitarianism as a complete moral system or a universal decision procedure to 
justify IPR, we do not need to fret about the demanding nature of utilitarianism or its 
conflicts with moral intuitions. 
We said that the classic objections to utilitarianism were irrelevant "to a large extent", 
because some of them are arguably relevant in an indirect way, in that they reflect unease, of 
various different kinds, about the prospect that the total amount of utility created should be 
the sole consideration related to the choice of action. Our adoption of the modest claim that 
the promotion of utility should be one such consideration—and one particularly relevant to 
the framing of law and policy in relation to IPR—does not fall foul of those objections. It 
allows that there might be other considerations—be they deontological worries about rights, 
or concerns about distributive justice—which could also be relevant. Thus, our endorsement 
of the utilitarian justification for intellectual property law is implicitly qualified. Utilitarian 
considerations can provide a pro tanto justification, but conceivably this might be defeated in 
certain cases by other considerations. 
How should we construe "utility"  
As we saw above, the L & E justification of IPR, like L & E more generally, makes the 
assumption that the notion of utility boils down to preferences for goods and services, 
identified through people’s willingness to pay. This approach suggested that economic 
indicators such as gross domestic product (GDP) could be regarded as proxies for national 
well-being. 
These assumptions have increasingly been questioned in recent years, in the light of empirical 
research that suggests divergence between economic measures and other indicators of well-
being. The best-known research is that done by Richard Easterlin in the 1970s, which 
appeared to show that, although within a given country at a given time people with higher 
incomes were more likely to report being happy; between countries, and within countries 
over time, the average reported level of happiness does not correlate very strongly with 
GDP.
74
 This result is known as the "Easterlin paradox". 
The significance of this evidence—and numerous subsequent studies which have gone over 
similar ground—has been much debated. While Easterlin and his*E.I.P.R. 204  supporters 
continue to defend his position, others argue that there is no paradox and that increases in 
GDP do correlate positively with increases in happiness.
75
 What is not in dispute, however, is 
the fact that, if there is a correlation between GDP and happiness, it is not a straightforward 
equivalence. For example, Ruut Veenhoven, a prominent sceptic about the Easterlin paradox, 
acknowledges the existence of cases where GDP growth is not paralleled by rising happiness 
(although he argues that these are outnumbered by cases where growth is paralleled by rising 
happiness); and observes that "the correlation between happiness and economic growth is 
strongest in the poor nations … and almost zero in the nations where the income per capita is 
at the upper middle level and the high level".
76
 Thus, while it may be the case that GDP 
growth tends in general to have a positive impact on happiness, the evidence does not suggest 
that levels of GDP can be taken as a proxy for levels of national happiness. 
It cannot be taken for granted, of course, that self-reported happiness is itself an accurate 
measure of well-being—the reliability and validity of happiness measures is also subject to 
debate. However, happiness does have a strong intuitive claim to be a constituent or at least 
an indicator of well-being. The lack of equivalence between the two factors thus casts doubt 
on whether GDP can be taken as a proxy for national well-being. 
GDP has other serious weaknesses as a proxy for well-being. It is a measure of overall 
activity within an economy and takes no account of the distribution of benefits within or 
indeed, outside it. It includes activity which arguably is detrimental to well-being rather than 
beneficial to it, such as increased use of fuel during traffic jams. It is a measure of current 
economic activity and takes no account of later consequences, for example, through 
environmental effects, which may have significant negative effects on general well-being in 
the longer term.
77
  
In recognition of the limitations of economic measures, governments have begun to look 
more directly at well-being in the context of public policy. In the UK, the Prime Minister, 
David Cameron, in a speech on November 25, 2010, declared his intention to measure 
national progress not merely by standard of living, but by quality of life. The UK’s Office of 
National Statistics (ONS) subsequently instituted a programme entitled Measuring National 
Well-being.
78
 Similar developments have been occurring elsewhere in Europe.
79
 International 
organisations have followed a similar trend. In 2009, the European Commission issued "GDP 
and Beyond", a roadmap of five key actions to improve the EU’s indicators of progress in 
ways more appropriate to citizens’ concerns than GDP alone,80 while the OECD introduced a 
"Better Life Index" in 2011.
81
 The UN introduced the Human Development Index as far back 
as 1990, again with the aim of shifting focus from financial to people-centred indicators.
82
  
The rejection of GDP as a proxy for well-being does not necessarily imply that it should have 
no role whatsoever in the justification of IPR. As the above discussion shows, although there 
is disagreement about the nature of the relationship between GDP and national well-being, 
even those who defend the Easterlin paradox acknowledge a positive relationship between the 
two in certain contexts. GDP data might thus serve as evidence relevant to judgments about 
national well-being, alongside other kinds of evidence. What we reject is not the use of GDP 
per se, but its hitherto dominant role as the sole criterion relative to the justification of IPR. 
What should replace GDP?  
The preceding sections of this article have given a qualified endorsement of the utilitarian 
basis of the justification for intellectual property law, but rejected the assumption that GDP 
can be taken as a proxy for "utility" or national well-being. This raises the question of what 
should be put in its place. In this section, we argue that it should be replaced by a broadly 
based conception of well-being, supported by a similarly broadly based approach to 
measurement, utilising a range of subjective and objective measures (which might continue to 
include GDP). 
The obvious implication of the rejection of GDP as a proxy for well-being is that we should 
base the justification for intellectual property law more directly upon well-being itself. This 
immediately throws up a serious challenge, however. Philosophers do not agree on a single, 
universal, theory of well-being. Rather, there are several competing accounts. There are 
broadly hedonistic accounts, which hold that well-being is constituted by happiness, or a 
balance of pleasure over pain. Related to these are accounts which focus on life-satisfaction. 
Others focus on the satisfaction of desires or "preferences" about the world.
83
 Accounts of 
both these types can be regarded as "subjective", since they ground*E.I.P.R. 205  well-being 
ultimately in the mental states or attitudes of the individual subject. Other accounts wholly or 
partly reject this dependence, and are therefore regarded as "objective". Objective-list 
accounts specify a list of heterogeneous components of well-being (which may include some 
subjective elements).
84
 Aristotelian theories focus on some notion of human flourishing, 
typically reflecting the development and exercise of certain capacities.
85
 There are numerous 
different variants of these different approaches, and hybrids which incorporate elements of 
more than one. 
There is no prospect that the philosophical issues which divide the proponents of the 
competing approaches are likely to be resolved in the near future. This fact may seem to 
render the task of replacing GDP a hopeless one. The choice of one of the competing 
approaches over the others, in the absence of conclusive arguments for its superiority, would 
seem arbitrary, and invite challenge from those who favour the rival theories. This problem is 
not unique to the justification of intellectual property law. It applies more widely to the 
adoption of well-being as a goal for public policy, and the measurement of well-being to 
inform such policy. 
However, we argue that there is, contrary to initial appearances, likely to be a substantial area 
of common ground between the rival theories.
86
 This is because things may be relevant to 
well-being in different ways: they may be constitutive of well-being, or they may tend to 
produce well-being, or they may do neither of these things but nevertheless act as indicators 
of well-being. Something which stands in one or other of these relationships to well-being 
may be considered a marker of well-being. Markers of well-being, notwithstanding the 
different relationships in which they stand with respect to well-being itself, are all potentially 
relevant to its measurement. Data concerning a marker of well-being will facilitate the 
making of judgments about well-being itself. 
The competing theories disagree about what constitutes well-being. However, for each theory 
it will be the case that other things beyond what it regards as constitutive of well-being will 
be either productive or indicative of well-being. These are likely to include things that a 
different theory would regard as constitutive of well-being. When this is the case, although 
the two theories will remain in disagreement about whether the item in question is a 
constituent of well-being, they can both agree that it is a marker of well-being. 
For example, proponents of an objective-list theory of well-being are likely to include 
physical health in their list of objective goods: for them, it will be a constituent of well-
being.
87
 Hedonism about well-being implies that physical health is not constitutive of well-
being: on this view, well-being is constituted only by happiness. Nevertheless, a hedonist 
would be likely to acknowledge that good physical health is, in general, something that tends 
to promote happiness: all else being equal, healthy people are likely to be happier than 
unhealthy people. There is ample empirical evidence to support that view. So hedonists could 
reasonably acknowledge physical health as something that is in general productive of 
happiness and is therefore a marker of well-being.
88
  
Conversely, it would be reasonable for an objective-list theorist to acknowledge that people 
who possess the goods on their list (such as physical health) are, all else being equal, likely to 
be happier than people who do not, or who possess them to a lesser extent. The objective-list 
theorist, while rejecting happiness as a constituent of his list,
89
 could therefore acknowledge 
it as a more or less reliable indicator of the extent to which people possess paradigm objective 
goods, and therefore as a marker of well-being. 
Thus, we suggest, the significant differences between several theories relating to what is to be 
regarded as a constituent of well-being in its own right nevertheless allow the prospect of a 
broad area of common ground concerning the markers of well-being. 
There are, of course, limits to both the breadth and the depth of consensus on the markers of 
well-being. For example, we would expect Aristotelian theorists to reject happiness as even a 
marker of well-being in certain contexts: if, for example, it is drug-induced and therefore not 
linked to the development or exercise of human capacities. 
When we include other markers of well-being as well as its constituents, it is important to 
note that the extent to which something is generally productive or indicative of well-being is 
always likely to be a matter of degree. For example, all else being equal, it is in general likely 
to be the case that happier people are also those who score more highly on possession of 
paradigm objective goods such as health. However, this will not always be the case: there 
will sometimes be other factors influencing their happiness which objective theorists will not 
accept as contributing to their well-being. Markers of well-being can thus be more or less 
reliable.*E.I.P.R. 206   
Note also that, while the rival theories make their own pronouncements about what well-
being consists in, the question of what is generally productive or indicative of well-being as 
defined by these theories is not solely one for their proponents to rule on. It is, in part, an 
empirical matter. The extent to which paradigm objective goods like health correlate with 
subjective states such as happiness is something on which empirical research can cast light. 
We propose that in the context of public policy in general and intellectual property law in 
particular it would be desirable to adopt a theory-neutral approach to well-being based upon 
likely areas of consensus between the rival theories regarding the markers of well-being. This 
approach would involve identifying markers of well-being that would be likely to be 
acknowledged by all or most of the competing theories of well-being. These markers would 
be things that, according to different theories, would be either constitutive, productive or 
indicative of well-being. We suggest that the measurement of well-being should be targeted 
at a range of such markers, ideally including at least some of the things which each theory 
regards as constitutive of well-being. This would support a broadly based approach to 
measuring well-being, including both objective and subjective elements. Suitable markers of 
well-being would be identified both by considering the implications of the different theories 
of well-being, and also by examining empirical research on correlations between different 
subjective and objective measures. 
We argue that in the context of public policy, the theory-neutral approach is preferable to the 
alternative of choosing one of the rival theories of well-being.
90
 It seeks to identify and build 
upon areas of common ground regarding the markers of well-being, which can form the basis 
of a body of shared assumptions about well-being to underpin its measurement. It recognises, 
however, the imperfect nature of consensus, and the need for continuing debate in those areas 
where it does not hold. In a separate article, we propose a list of markers of well-being that 
would be consistent with the theory-neutral approach and consider what implications these 
would have for IPR.
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While our proposal may still be ideological, it is better grounded and does not 
suffer from the flaws of the L & E of IPR  
An obvious objection our proposal encounters is that by replacing L & E as a justification for 
IPR by a well-being approach, we are simply replacing one ideology by another. This section 
shows that every policy position is by definition ideological as it incorporates ideas and a 
plan of action for a society. Thus, the current L & E is ideological. It is neither good nor bad 
per se but it is not scientific. By definition, our proposal is thus also an ideology, but by 
contrast, and even if it also relies on scientific data, it remains open to other ideas and thus is 
far less strongly ideological. 
To address the criticism that our proposal simply replaces one ideology (L & E) by another 
(welfarism), we first need to define ideology and then show the problems the concept entails. 
Definition of ideology  
It is worth briefly mentioning the origin of the term and concept of ideology as it helps in 
understanding its meaning. While it was coined by a Frenchman (Destutt de Tracy) after the 
French Revolution, its first developers were Marx and Engels.
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 For them, ideology was 
negative (i.e. it was by definition an instrument oppressing the masses), so we needed to get 
rid of ideology and it would no longer exist. However, as history and further evolution on the 
thinking of the term showed, this is not the case—ideologies are not by definition negative or 
ephemeral,
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 but they are pervasive and are here to stay.
94
  
An ideology can be held only by one person (individual ideology) or held by a group 
(collective ideology). A political ideology is a set of ideas, beliefs, opinions and values which 
aim to influence public policy,
95
 held by significant groups in order to preserve, modify or 
overthrow the existing social and political arrangements and processes of a political 
community.
96
 Thus ideologies are inherently value-based, and include norms about how 
people should behave and what governments should do
97
:*E.I.P.R. 207   
"All ideologies therefore have the following features. They (1) offer an account of the 
existing order, usually in the form of a ‘world view’, (2) advance a model of a desired future, 
a vision of the ‘good society’ and (3) explain how political change can and should be brought 
about." 
98
  
In short, ideologies are action-orientated systems of thought towards preserving or changing 
social arrangements
99
:  
"So defined, ideologies are neither good nor bad, true nor false, open nor closed, liberating 
nor oppressive — they can be all these things".100  
As ideologies are value-based, they are only good or bad inasmuch as one agrees or disagrees 
with their values.
101
 An ideology’s aim is to prioritise a value or values over others and claim 
legitimacy over what they claim.
102
 Ideologies are pervasive because in practice neither 
persons nor groups occupy a neutral point of view.
103
 Ideologies are also pervasive in the 
sense that we produce, disseminate and consume them our entire lives, consciously or 
unconsciously.
104
 We cannot do without ideologies because they make sense of the world we 
live in.
105
 Therefore, "there is no ‘ideology-free’ political or legal programme, given that law 
and politics are expressions of values and underpinned by force".
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An ideology is political because if one takes away the political aspect of the term, it is no 
longer an ideology but a "belief system", "world view", "doctrine" or "political 
philosophy".
107
 Thus utilitarianism is not an ideology but a branch of moral philosophy. 
However, it has been used by lawyers and economists. When utilitarianism is applied to law, 
it exits the realm of moral philosophies and becomes an ideology. 
Problems with ideologies  
There are two problems with ideologies. First, their producers often claim they are not 
ideologies but on the contrary, they claim that they are "scientific", "natural" or "universal", 
something that is impossible. For instance, liberals argue that communism and fascism are 
ideologies but refuse to accept that liberalism is also an ideology.
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 But no one can prove 
that one theory of justice is preferable to any other; that human beings possess rights or are 
entitled to freedom.
109
 A second problem is that sometimes ideologies mix or merge facts 
with values, making it difficult to distinguish between ideology and science.
110
 Indeed, "what 
you see is not always what you get", i.e. there are meanings inside ideologies which are 
hidden not only from their consumers but also from their producers sometimes. So studying 
ideology involves extracting and decoding these hidden meanings from social and legal 
practices.
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This mixing between values and facts is what happened with the Chicago School and the L & 
E of IPR. This may also explain why L & E thrived so well as no one thought it was 
ideological but instead thought that it was scientific.
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 As we have seen in the section "The 
rationales of intellectual property law" above, L & E is ideological and not scientific, even if 
it takes economic science as its basis. Most contemporary intellectual property lawyers and 
policy-makers are still wedded to the L & E of IPR because they (mistakenly) think it is 
scientific and the only way to conceive intellectual property law scientifically, and by 
extrapolation, the only way to envisage intellectual property law seriously. 
Our proposal is not as strongly ideological  
What we propose in summary is to readjust the justification for IPR by taking all aspects of 
well-being rather than simply the proxy of income. Policy-makers should thereafter readjust 
the intellectual property laws according to this new justification when necessary.
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 However, 
as we said in the section "What well-being research has shown" above, we do not exclude the 
possibility that other considerations such as natural rights, fairness or distributive justice can 
justify IPR and may also have to be integrated in the IPR framework along with well-being. 
Our proposal is meant to be open to other ideas. Moreover, our approach does not take a 
stand on*E.I.P.R. 208  the debate between rival subjective and objective theories of well-
being. Rather, it seeks to identify markers of well-being that could be recognised as either 
constitutive, productive or indicative of well-being under all mainstream theories. Our 
proposal is also dynamic in the sense that it may change once more data is available and more 
research occurs.
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 In short, we adopt an open belief system as opposed to a closed one and 
aim to be as non-dogmatic as possible. Maybe we can venture to call our proposal a "soft 
ideology". In conclusion, our proposal is an ideology because it contains a plan of action to 
influence policy, but, contrary to other ideologies, it does not prioritise a value over others 
and claim legitimacy over what it asserts. We also do not fall foul of the two problems 
associated with ideologies. We are conscious that we are embracing an ideology. While we 
rely on scientific data, we separate our ideas from the science. 
Why our proposal is not paternalistic  
Another worry that has sometimes been expressed regarding the promotion of well-being or 
happiness as aims of public policy is that it might be paternalistic.
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 Paternalism has been 
defined by Gerald Dworkin as:  
"[T]he interference of a state or an individual with another person, against their will, and 
defended or motivated by a claim that the person interfered with will be better off or 
protected from harm." 
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Can intellectual property law be considered paternalistic, if it is justified on the basis of a 
conception of well-being? Let us consider the three elements of the above definition in turn. 
Does it constitute interference (by the state) with another person? Yes. IPR prevent people 
from copying or using the works and inventions which they protect except under certain 
conditions. Is this interference against the will of the persons concerned? There will not be a 
single answer to this question, of course, since IPR will apply to many persons, who will no 
doubt have different attitudes to the restrictions it imposes. But we may assume that it will be 
against the will of at least some persons—if it were not, there would be no need for legal 
restrictions. 
Is intellectual property law motivated by the claim that the person interfered with will be 
better off or protected from harm? The position on this point is rather complex. In the case of 
copyright law, the restrictions affect the general population, who are barred from using or 
obtaining copyrighted works without paying a royalty to their creator. The utilitarian 
argument in favour of copyright protection assumes that the enforcement of copyright will 
improve the well-being first of the creators of works, by ensuring that they are able to receive 
recompense for the effort and expense they have incurred. Secondly, the argument runs, it 
will also benefit the well-being of the general population, by providing an incentive for the 
creation of works. 
Insofar as the utilitarian justification is based upon the well-being of the general population, 
then, considered collectively, the people to whom the restrictions apply are the same people 
to whom the benefits are supposed to accrue. At the individual level, however, this is not the 
case. The main utilitarian argument for preventing person A from using or obtaining 
copyrighted works without paying a royalty is not that person A will be worse off for having 
done so. Rather, it is that widespread behaviour of this kind will ultimately affect the well-
being of an indefinite number of people (including, but not limited to, those who do it), 
through the weakening of incentives to create such works. Insofar as the utilitarian 
justification is concerned with the well-being of the creators of works, the restrictions do not 
apply to the creators themselves but to others who would otherwise benefit unfairly from 
their work. Sometimes creators might not wish these restrictions to apply: in that case, IPR 
would be paternalistic if works were protected by copyright against their authors’ will. 
However, it is usually possible to renounce to one’s rights arising from one’s copyright. 
In the case of patents, once again the claim behind the utilitarian justification for protecting 
IPR rests to a large extent on the well-being of the general population: they stand to benefit 
from the innovations that patent protection helps motivate inventors to produce. Again, the 
restrictions imposed by IPR apply in theory to the general population, since everyone is 
bound by those restrictions. However, in practice, the restrictions have a direct impact 
primarily on the minority who would otherwise wish to copy patent-protected inventions. The 
restrictions imposed by IPR on these people are not for their own benefit. 
There is also an indirect impact on the wider population in that they are denied the use of 
products that would otherwise have been produced if not deterred by patent restrictions, and 
may have to pay more for products which are so protected. How significant these impacts are 
in practice is likely to vary from case to case. Where a very large up-front investment is 
required to develop a particular product, it seems unlikely that firms or individuals would 
make this commitment without the benefit of IPR protection—thus there would be nothing 
for others to copy, and therefore any negative impact of the IPR restrictions upon the choice 
of products available to the general population would be more hypothetical than actual. In 
other cases, IPR restrictions may have a more tangible effect upon the choices available to the 
general population. As with copyright, at the individual level the benefits flowing from the 
restrictions IPR places upon any given person fall not primarily to that individual but to the 
wider public.*E.I.P.R. 209   
Note also that any effect of IPR restrictions on consumers, to the extent that it has an impact 
on well-being,
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 is itself something that would need to be factored into a utilitarian 
assessment of the costs and benefits of a particular case. If the likely effect upon consumers is 
relatively high compared with the anticipated benefits in terms of incentivisation, it should 
not be taken for granted that a utilitarian justification based upon well-being would support 
IPR restrictions. 
To the extent that the utilitarian justification of patent protection rests upon the well-being of 
inventors rather than of the general public, it does not appear to be paternalistic. The 
restrictions imposed by IPR do not impinge upon them. As in the case of copyright, there 
might be an element of paternalism if IPR protection was imposed against their wishes: 
however, it is not compulsory to patent an invention. 
What, then, should we conclude about whether basing the justification of IPR upon well-
being would involve paternalism? We have seen that the first two criteria of Dworkin’s 
definition are met: IPR do constitute "interference", which can be assumed to be without the 
consent of those interfered with at least some of the time. As for his third criterion—that the 
people interfered with are also those who are supposed to be benefited—insofar as the 
utilitarian justification of IPR rests on the well-being of creators and inventors, it does not 
meet this criterion and therefore does not seem paternalistic, provided that their intellectual 
property rights are not enforced against their will. Insofar as the justification rests upon the 
well-being of the general public, if they are considered collectively it could be argued that 
Dworkin’s third criterion is met, since the general public are also affected, directly or 
indirectly, by IPR restrictions. 
At the individual level, however, the justification for the restrictions imposed by IPR on any 
given person is not, or not primarily, based upon the well-being of that person, but on that of 
the wider public. As far as individuals are concerned, therefore, the third criterion does not 
appear to be met. We might note here that Dworkin does not regard as paternalistic:  
"[R]estrictions which are in the interests of a class of persons taken collectively but are such 
that the immediate interest of each individual is furthered by his violating the rule when 
others adhere to it." 
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Dworkin is talking here about legislation for a 40-hour working week, but IPR would seem to 
fall within the same category. In this respect, IPR can also be compared to laws against tax 
evasion, for example. Here too, the law impinges upon everyone for the sake of the well-
being of all (if we assume a utilitarian justification of taxation) but, in the case of each 
individual, the beneficiary of the intervention insofar as it affects her own behaviour is not 
herself but the general population. 
We conclude, therefore, that although the justification of IPR in terms of well-being may 
appear paternalistic at first sight, it is not paternalistic at the level of the individual, and there 
are no reasonable grounds here to reject our proposal. 
Conclusion  
In conclusion, we have shown that the current still predominant justification for IPR (the 
Chicago School of economics which takes maximisation of economic wealth as the only 
proxy for well-being) is both flawed and ideological, and that replacing it by a well-being 
approach is warranted. In addition, this new approach is not as ideological, nor is it 
paternalistic. Policy-makers should therefore base IPR on this "utilitarian justification 
revisited", although by no means exclusively (e.g. deontological considerations may still 
matter). In our I.P.Q. article
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 we identify the markers of well-being according to the theory-
neutral approach of well-being and apply them to patents and copyright to check whether the 
current legal framework respects this well-being approach, and, if not, what can be done to 
remedy this. 
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